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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether retailers have 
standing under S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125(a) (1994), to bring false advertising claims against 
manufacturers of products that compete with those the 
retailers sell. The District Court answered this question in 
the negative and dismissed the Complaint. Conte Bros. 
Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 
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709, 711 (D.N.J. 1998). Based on the facts alleged in the 
Complaint, we conclude that the retailer plaintiffs do not 
satisfy the prudential standing requirements implicit in 
S 43(a) of the Lanham Act. We therefore affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Appellants are a putative nationwide class of retail sellers 
of motor oil and other engine lubricants that purportedly 
compete with Slick 50, a Teflon-based engine lubricant 
manufactured by Appellees. According to the Complaint, 
Slick 50 features a formula of Teflon suspended in particle 
form in motor oil. Compl. P 17; App. 16. Appellees' 
marketing materials state that one quart of Slick 50 
substitutes for one quart of regular motor oil at the time of 
an oil change. Compl. P 18; App. 16. The Complaint alleges 
that the Appellees falsely advertised that the addition of 
Slick 50 would reduce the friction of moving parts, decrease 
engine wear, and improve engine performance and 
efficiency. See, e.g., Compl.PP 24-29. 
 
In 1996, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") brought 
an action under 15 U.S.C. S 45(a) challenging the veracity 
of and substantiation for the claimed benefits of Slick 50. 
Compl. P 31; App. 20. The parties settled. Compl. P 33; 
App. 21. Under the terms of the settlement, the Appellees 
were enjoined from disseminating false or unsubstantiated 
claims regarding Slick 50 and agreed to provide $10 million 
in discounts, cash rebates and free products to affected 
consumers by January 1998. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. P 24,301. 
 
Subsequent to the settlement of the FTC suit, Appellants 
raised the same allegations in this action for damages 
under S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S 1125(a) 
(1994), and certain state consumer protection statutes that 
are not at issue in this appeal. The Appellants propose to 
represent: 
 
       [a]ll persons in the United States who, at any time 
       between the time Slick 50 was first marketed to the 
       public and the present, have offered for sale, either as 
       retailers or wholesalers, motor oil products that 
       compete directly with Slick 50. 
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Compl. P 15; App. 13. "Motor oil products," as Appellants 
use the term in the Complaint, include "engine additive, 
engine treatment products, motor oil or motor oil additives 
(sometimes referred to as engine treatments) that compete 
with" Slick 50. Compl. P 1; App. 9. In addition to the 
allegations regarding Appellees' asserted 
misrepresentations, which largely mirror the allegations in 
the FTC suit, the Complaint alleges that Appellees' false 
advertisements increased Slick 50's sales and 
concomitantly decreased sales of the competing products 
sold by the class members. The harm the Appellants allege 
they suffered is loss of sales of products they sell, such as 
regular motor oil, that compete with Slick 50. 
 
Appellees moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of 
standing or, in the alternative, to strike the Appellants' 
class allegations. The District Court dismissed the 
Complaint on the ground that retailers like Appellants 
lacked standing under the Lanham Act to pursue false 
advertising claims against manufacturers of competing 
products. Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 
50, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 709, 712-14 (D.N.J. 1998). More 
specifically, the District Court held that only"direct 
commercial competitors" or "surrogates" for direct 
commercial competitors have standing to pursue claims 
under S 43(a). The District Court also held that the 
Complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to infer that the 
requisite direct competitive relationship existed. This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
Our review of matters of standing and statutory 
construction is plenary. Davis v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 
121 F.3d 92, 94 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); UPS Worldwide 
Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 66 F.3d 621, 
624 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1171, 116 S. Ct. 
1261, 134 L.Ed.2d 210 (1996). When reviewing an order of 
dismissal for lack of standing, we accept as true all 
material allegations of the complaint and construe them in 
favor of the plaintiff. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 
118 S. Ct. 1003, 1017 (1998); Trump Hotels & Casino 
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Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 482 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
A. 
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, pursuant to which this 
suit was brought, provides: 
 
       (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods 
       or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
       commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
       any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
       origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
       misleading representation of fact, which-- 
 
       (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
       or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
       association of such person with another person, or 
       as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
       her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
       another person, or 
 
       (B) in a commercial advertising or promotion, 
       misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, 
       or geographic origin of his or her or another person's 
       goods, services, or commercial activities, 
       shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
       believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
       damaged by such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (emphasis added). The question in this 
suit is whether, in enacting the Lanham Act, which 
includes the quoted language, Congress intended to confer 
standing on plaintiffs in Appellants' position. For the 
reasons set forth below, we hold that Congress did not so 
intend, and we therefore affirm. 
 
Standing is comprised of both constitutional and 
prudential components. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 
1161 (1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 
S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). The 
constitutional component, derived from the Art. III "case" or 
"controversy" requirement, requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that he or she suffered "injury in fact," that 
the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the 
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defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a 
favorable decision. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161; Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-17 (1998). 
 
The parties do not dispute that the allegations in the 
Complaint satisfy these constitutional standing 
requirements. Because this issue is jurisdictional, however, 
we address it here. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011 
(question of Art. III standing is threshold issue that should 
be addressed before issues of prudential and statutory 
standing). The Complaint alleges that the plaintiff class has 
lost sales of motor oil products as a result of Appellees' 
false advertising. Compl. P 43; App. 22. These allegations 
satisfy the first two components of Art. III standing, injury 
in fact and causation. Appellants seek, among other things, 
"monetary damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs and 
the Class members for their lost profits as a result of the 
Defendants' conduct." Compl. P 51(C); App. 25. The 
requested relief, if granted, would redress Appellants' 
alleged injuries and therefore satisfies the redressability 
requirement. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, we 
perceive no constitutional obstacle to our consideration of 
this case. 
 
Under certain circumstances, prudential, as opposed to 
constitutional, standing considerations limit a plaintiff's 
ability to bring suit. These prudential considerations are a 
set of judge-made rules forming an integral part of "judicial 
self-government." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). 
The aim of this form of judicial self-governance is to 
determine whether the plaintiff is "a proper party to invoke 
judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the 
court's remedial powers." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1334 n.8, 89 
L.Ed.2d 501 (1986); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2970, 86 
L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) (federal courts adopt prudential limits 
on standing "to avoid deciding questions of broad social 
import where no individual rights would be vindicated and 
to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best 
suited to assert a particular claim") (quoting Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S. 
Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). 
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No single formula is capable of answering every 
prudential standing question. Clarke v. Securities Indus. 
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16, 107 S. Ct. 750, 757 n.16, 
93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) ("Generalizations about standing to 
sue are largely worthless as such.") (quoting Data 
Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151, 90 S. Ct. 827, 
829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)); see also Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 537 n.33, 103 S. Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) 
("[I]t is simply not possible to fashion an across-the-board 
and easily applied standing rule which can serve as a tool 
of decision for every case."). Several considerations falling 
within the general rubric of prudential standing, however, 
are typically invoked. Thus, it is generally required (1) that 
a litigant "assert his [or her] own legal interests rather than 
those of third parties," (2) that courts "refrain from 
adjudicating abstract questions of wide public significance 
which amount to generalized grievances," and (3) that a 
litigant demonstrate that the asserted interests are 
arguably within the "zone of interests" intended to be 
protected by the statute, rule or constitutional provision on 
which the claim is based. Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 
F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also 
UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal 
Serv., 66 F.3d 621 (3d Cir. 1995); Trump Hotels & Casino 
Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 485 (3d 
Cir. 1998); Davis v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 121 F.3d 92, 
96 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In this case, the Appellants assert their own interests, 
and their dispute is concrete in nature. Further, neither of 
the parties has framed the issue by reference to the "zone 
of interests" test. The issue in this appeal, rather, is the 
Appellants' statutory standing -- that is, whether Congress 
intended parties in Appellants' position to have standing to 
sue under S 43(a). 
 
Though sometimes analogized to the "zone of interests" 
test identified above, the question of a party's standing to 
sue under a given statute is not governed exclusively by the 
"zone of interests" test. The "zone of interests" test 
developed in the administrative law context where the issue 
is whether a person aggrieved by an administrative decision 
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has standing to challenge it under S 10 of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. S 702 (1994) (the 
"APA"). See Davis, 121 F.3d at 96-98 (recounting 
development of "zone of interests" test). Certain attributes 
of the "zone of interests" test, most notably its liberal tilt 
toward recognizing standing to challenge agency action, see 
id. at 98 ("zone of interests" test "not meant to be especially 
demanding") (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S. Ct. at 
757), were developed in the administrative context, and are 
most applicable there. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16 ("The 
principal cases in which the `zone of interest' test has been 
applied are those involving claims under the APA, and the 
test is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning 
of S 702."); cf. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161 ("[T]he breadth of 
the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of 
law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of 
interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial 
review of administrative action under the `generous review 
provisions' of the [APA] may not do so for other purposes.") 
(citations omitted); see also William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L. J. 221, 255-263 (1988) 
(criticizing use of "zone of interest" test outside of 
administrative context). 
 
The "zone of interests" test, therefore, is not exclusive for 
determining statutory standing outside of the 
administrative context in which it was formulated, Clarke, 
479 U.S. at 400 n.16, 107 S. Ct. at 757 n.16, 93 L.Ed.2d 
757 ("[w]hile inquiries into reviewability or prudential 
standing in other contexts may bear some resemblance to 
a `zone of interests' inquiry under the [APA], it is not a test 
of universal application"); see also Davis, 121 F.3d at 97 
n.7 (recognizing that variations of the zone of interests test 
apply outside of the administrative review context), and it is 
clear that we are free to consider other barometers of 
congressional intent in determining whether a party has 
standing to sue under a particular statute. See Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 537 n.33 (1983) (focusing exclusively on 
directness of injury or whether injury is "within zone of 
interests protected by antitrust laws" leads to contradictory 
and inconsistent results). 
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We believe it is more appropriate to inquire as to the 
class's statutory standing free from the formalistic 
constraints of the "zone of interests" test and its links to 
administrative review. For purposes of determining a party's 
standing under S 43(a), we equate our task with the inquiry 
into congressional intent conducted by the Supreme Court 
in Associated General in determining standing to sue under 
the Clayton Act. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 (inquiry "at 
bottom . . . turns on congressional intent"). We turn to this 
question in Section II(C) infra. 
 
B. 
 
Before reaching this central issue, however, we mustfirst 
address a related question of statutory interpretation. 
Because prudential standing doctrine is judge-made and 
not the product of constitutional restraints on the power of 
the federal courts to hear claims, Congress can eliminate 
prudential restrictions on standing if it so desires. Bennett, 
117 S. Ct. at 1161; United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557, 116 S. Ct. 
1529, 1536, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996); Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2206 (1975); Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 99 S. 
Ct. 1601, 1609 n.9, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S. Ct. 364, 
366, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972). As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, however, Congress is presumed to 
incorporate background prudential standing principles, 
unless the statute expressly negates them. Bennett, 117 S. 
Ct. at 1162; Brown Group, 517 U.S. at 557, 116 S. Ct. at 
1536. 
 
The first inquiry, then, is whether Congress expressly 
negated prudential standing doctrine in passing the 
Lanham Act. In determining whether Congress intended to 
abrogate the background presumption that prudential 
standing doctrine applies, we consider the statutory text, 
its structure, and its legislative history. See Bennett, 117 S. 
Ct. at 1162-63 (considering purpose of Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.)), in 
determining whether Congress abrogated prudential 
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standing doctrine); Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 107-109, 99 S. 
Ct. at 1612-13, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (considering legislative 
history in determining whether Congress abrogated 
prudential standing doctrine); cf. Block v. Community 
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 344, 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2453- 
54, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) (whether party has standing to 
challenge administrative ruling interpreting Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 properly determined"not 
only from its express language, but also from the structure 
of the statutory scheme, its objectives, [and] its legislative 
history"). We hold, based on the text of S 43(a), the explicit 
language of the Lanham Act declaring its purpose, as well 
as the Lanham Act's legislative history, that Congress did 
not expressly negate prudential standing doctrine in 
passing the Lanham Act. 
 
We note first of all that background presumptions of 
prudential standing apply unless expressly negated by 
Congress. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162. The Supreme Court 
has twice held that Congress has not expressly negated 
background prudential standing doctrine merely by passing 
a statute the text of which admits of a broad interpretation. 
Thus, in Bennett, while the Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded that Congress intended standing to be limited 
only by constitutional constraints on the federal judicial 
power, it did so only after considering the broader purposes 
of the statute. Id. at 1162-63 ("Our readiness to take the 
term `any person'1 at face value is greatly augmented by two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute at issue in Bennet, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 16 U.S.C.), provides: 
 
       (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
       person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-- 
 
       (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any 
       other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent 
       permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is 
       alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or 
       regulation issued under the authority thereof; or 
 
       . . . . . . . . 
 
       (C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the 
       Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this 
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interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter 
of this legislation is the environment (a matter in which it 
is common to think all persons have an interest) and that 
the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question 
is to encourage enforcement by so-called `private attorneys 
general.' "). And in Associated General, the case most 
directly on point, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
incorporated prudential standing principles when it 
promulgated the Clayton Act. Associated General, 459 U.S. 
at 535 & n.31 (considering prudential limits on standing 
despite statutory language giving "[a]ny person who shall be 
injured in his business or property" standing to sue under 
the Clayton Act).2 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we must reject 
Appellants' contention that they are entitled to bring suit 
based on a literal reading of S 43(a). Initially, we note that 
our precedent goes beyond the text of the Lanham Act in 
determining whether a party has standing. See, e.g., Thorn 
v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(applying plain meaning rule to S 43(a) and then applying 
prudential standing doctrine before concluding that plaintiff 
had standing to bring action). The Appellants' plain 
language argument, moreover, misses the mark for a more 
fundamental reason. Limiting standing according to well- 
established prudential standing doctrine does no violence to 
the plain meaning of the statute, because, as explained 
above, Congress intends to incorporate prudential standing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       title which is not discretionary with the Secretary. The district 
       courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in 
       controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such 
       provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such 
       act or duty, as the case may be . . . . 
 
16 U.S.C. S 1540(g) (1994). 
 
2. Although the Court in Associated General did not make explicit 
findings regarding whether Congress expressly negated background 
prudential standing doctrine, the Court has subsequently cited 
Associated General for precisely that proposition. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. 
at 1162 (citing Associated General for the proposition that Congress 
legislates against the background of prudential standing doctrine unless 
it is expressly negated). We discuss Associated General at greater length 
in Section II(C) of this opinion. 
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principles unless it expresses its desire to negate them. 
Controlling precedent compels us to consider the statutory 
text in the larger context of both the statute's purpose and 
its background before we can conclude that Congress 
intended to confer standing as broadly as the statute's 
language suggests. 
 
First, we consider the text of the statute in discerning 
Congressional intent. In Bennett, the Supreme Court 
considered whether Congress intended to expand standing 
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") to the 
extent permitted by Art. III. The statutory language at issue 
in the ESA, which said that "any person" could commence 
suit, is, as noted by the Court, "an authorization of 
remarkable breadth when compared with the language 
Congress ordinarily uses." Id. at 1162. It is, indeed, broader 
than the relevant language in S 43(a), which says that "any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged" by conduct proscribed by the Lanham Act can 
bring suit. We find it significant that the Lanham Act limits 
the class of persons entitled to sue to those who can trace 
their injury to the anti-competitive conduct proscribed by 
the Act, and find in the text support for our conclusion that 
Congress did not abrogate principles of prudential 
standing. Furthermore, we note that the Supreme Court 
recently recognized that prudential standing principles were 
incorporated into the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971, 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C. S 431 et seq., an 
act with operative language at least as expansive as that 
found in the Lanham Act. Federal Election Comm'n. v. 
Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1783 (1998); 2 U.S.C. 
S 437g(a)(8)(A) (1994) ("[a]ny party aggrieved" may file a 
petition in district court seeking review). 
 
The structure of the Lanham Act provides further support 
for our conclusion that Congress did not intend to abrogate 
prudential limitations on standing. Congress specified its 
intent in enacting the Lanham Act in S 45 of the statute, 
which reads in pertinent part: 
 
       The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce 
       within the control of Congress by making actionable 
       the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such 
       commerce; to protect registered marks used in such 
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       commerce from interference by State, or territorial 
       legislation; to protect persons engaged in such 
       commerce against unfair competition; to prevent 
       fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of 
       reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable 
       imitations of registered marks, and to provide rights 
       and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions 
       respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair 
       competition entered into between the United States and 
       foreign nations. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1994) (emphasis added).3 This section 
makes clear that the focus of statute is on anti-competitive 
conduct in a commercial context. Conferring standing to 
the full extent implied by the text of S 43(a) would give 
standing to parties, such as consumers, having no 
competitive or commercial interests affected by the conduct 
at issue. This would not only ignore the purpose of the 
Lanham Act as expressed by S 45, but would run contrary 
to our precedent, see Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 
1163, 1174 (3d Cir. 1993) (consumers lack standing to 
bring Lanham Act false advertising claim), and that of other 
federal appellate courts. See Colligan v. Activities Club of 
New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1004, 92 S. Ct. 559, 30 L.Ed.2d 557 (1971); 
Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); 
Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 
697 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). The congressionally-stated 
purpose of the Lanham Act, far from indicating an express 
intent to abrogate prudential standing doctrine, evidences 
an intent to limit standing to a narrow class of potential 
plaintiffs possessing interests the protection of which 
furthers the purposes of the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act's 
commercial subject matter and express statement of 
purpose thus distinguish it from the statute considered by 
the Supreme Court in Bennett. The Supreme Court noted 
that the subject matter of the ESA -- the environment -- 
readily admitted of a finding that Congress intended to 
expand standing to the limit permitted by Art. III. Bennett, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The quoted portion of S 45 has not been altered since the Lanham Act 
was enacted in 1946. See Pub. L. No. 489, reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 412, 429. 
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117 S. Ct. at 1163 (noting that "the subject of the 
legislation makes the intent to permit enforcement by 
everyman even more plausible"). The same cannot be said 
of the expressly commercial purpose of the Lanham Act. 
 
Our conclusion regarding congressional intent is 
reinforced by the legislative history of the Lanham Act. The 
Senate Report regarding the Lanham Act repeatedly 
references the Act's focus on anti-competitive conduct in 
the commercial arena. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 
("There is no essential difference between trade-mark 
infringement and what is loosely called unfair 
competition."); id. (goal of Lanham Act is "to foster fair 
competition, and to secure to the business community the 
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their 
diversion from those who have created them to those who 
have not"). The legislative history accompanying the 1988 
revisions to the Lanham Act further emphasizes the Act's 
focus on commercial, anti-competitive conduct. See S. Rep. 
No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604 (May 12, 1988) (characterizing 
"competition between the parties" as a "traditional 
trademark infringement question[ ]"); id. at 5603 (identifying 
deterrence of acts of "unfair competition" as goal of Lanham 
Act). Our case law also recognizes the essentially 
commercial nature of the Lanham Act. Granite State Ins. 
Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 321 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (focus of the statute is on "commercial interests 
[that] have been harmed by a competitor's false 
advertising.") (emphasis in original). 
 
In enacting the Lanham Act in 1946, Congress sought to 
bring together various statutes regarding trademark 
protection that previously had been scattered throughout 
the United States Code. See id. at 1275-76 ("There are 
many reasons why there should be a new trade-mark 
statute. . . . [Trademark statutes have] been amended from 
time to time and supplemented by the act of March 19, 
1920, which has also been amended in several particulars. 
The result is a confused situation. . . . It seems desirable to 
collect these various statutes and have them in a single 
enactment."). Nothing in the Lanham Act's legislative 
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history evidences an intent to work a major change in the 
class of plaintiffs entitled to sue for damages. See id. at 
1275 ("The present act is substantially the act of February 
20, 1905."); S. Rep. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604 (May 12, 1988) 
(language regarding standing to bring action under S 43(a) 
unchanged by 1988 amendments). 
 
Earlier trademark statutes defined the class of eligible 
plaintiffs narrowly and in keeping with the goal of federal 
trademark law to protect good will. See S 7 of 1881 Act, 21 
Stat. 502, 504, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. (Mar. 3, 1881) 
(limiting right to sue to "owners" of trademark); S 16 of 
1905 Act, 33 Stat. 724, 728, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (Feb. 20, 
1905) (same); S 4 of 1920 Act, 41 Stat. 533, 534, 66th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 19, 1920) (same). In addition, these 
earlier acts were drafted against the backdrop of common 
law doctrine similar to today's prudential standing doctrine 
that limited the eligible plaintiff class. See Inwood Lab., Inc. 
v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 72 
L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) ("purpose of the Lanham Act was to 
codify and unify the common law of unfair competition and 
trademark protection"); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 109 S. Ct. 971, 
103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) ("law of unfair competition has its 
roots in the common-law tort of deceit"); see generally 1 
J.T. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition S 5:2 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing common-law 
origins of Lanham Act). There is no indication that 
Congress intended in any of the Lanham Act's statutory 
precursors, or in the Lanham Act itself for that matter, to 
abrogate the common law limitations on standing to sue. 
Cf. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 531-34 (describing 
congressional intent to incorporate common-law principles 
constraining class of plaintiffs entitled to sue under Clayton 
Act). 
 
In light of the text of S 43(a), other textual provisions 
defining the purpose of the Lanham Act, the Lanham Act's 
legislative history and its common-law origins, we hold that 
Congress did not intend to abrogate prudential limitations 
on the standing of plaintiffs to bring suit under S 43(a). 
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C. 
 
Our previous opinions analyzing standing under S 43(a) 
have assumed, without undergoing the analysis prescribed 
by Supreme Court cases such as Bennett, that prudential 
standing doctrine limits the class of plaintiffs entitled to 
bring suit. In Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d 
Cir. 1984), we first addressed S 43(a)'s standing 
requirements.4 The issue there was whether an individual 
investor in a bankrupt company had standing to sue for 
allegedly false advertisements by a competitor of the 
bankrupt company. Thorn, 736 F.2d at 931. We looked to 
S 43(a)'s plain language and concluded that "it is this 
court's function to grant standing to Thorn if he is a person 
who believes that he has been damaged by [the defendant's] 
use of false representations." Id. at 932. Because the 
investor alleged with specificity both "a section 43(a) 
violation and a resulting injury," we concluded that "the 
mere fact that Thorn [was] not a competitor of [the 
defendant] d[id] not, in and of itself, preclude him from 
bringing suit under section 43(a)." Id. at 933. Though we 
thus concluded that the plaintiff had satisfied 
constitutional standing prerequisites, we went on to 
consider whether "there [we]re any prudential reasons 
which support a judicial determination that Thorn[was] 
without standing . . . ." Id. We defined the "dispositive 
question" of a party's prudential standing as "whether the 
party has a reasonable interest to be protected against false 
advertising." Id. (quoting Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 
608 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 1 R. Callmann, Unfair 
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, S 18.2(b) at 625 
(3d ed. 1967))). While we never precisely defined the critical 
term "reasonable interest," we noted that Thorn's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Though S 43(a) was modified after the Thorn decision, the operative 
language defining the class of persons entitled to bring a private 
damages action has not undergone substantive change. See Thorn, 736 
F.2d at 931 (quoting the then-existing S 43(a): "Section 43(a) provides 
that an action may be brought `by any person doing business in the 
locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which 
said 
locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is 
likely 
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or 
representation.' "). 
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allegations of injury -- notably the loss of his investment 
due to the defendant's false advertising campaign-- were 
"sufficient[ly] direct" to satisfy any prudential standing 
considerations. Id. 
 
Our subsequent decisions have carried forward this 
prudential "reasonable interest" requirement and have 
grappled with defining the term with greater precision. We 
revisited the issue of standing under S 43(a) in Serbin v. 
Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993). In that 
case, the issue was whether a consumer whose purchase 
was allegedly influenced by false advertising had standing 
under the Lanham Act to bring a suit for damages. We held 
that consumers lack standing to bring false advertising 
claims under the Lanham Act, and we reaffirmed the 
principle announced in Thorn that, the plain language of 
S 43(a) notwithstanding, prudential concerns dictate that a 
sufficiently direct injury be alleged before standing to sue is 
recognized: 
 
       The "sufficient direct injury" alleged by Thorn was that 
       his investment in Florida-Eastern was destroyed by the 
       misconduct of one of Florida-Eastern's chief 
       competitors. Thus, this Court's determination that the 
       plaintiff in Thorn had a "reasonable interest to be 
       protected under section 43(a)" permitted a false 
       advertising suit by one who, while not in his own 
       person a competitor of the alleged rogue enterprise, 
       was, nonetheless, so situated that he could quite 
       reasonably be regarded as a surrogate for such 
       competitor. 
 
Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added). We fleshed out 
the concept of "reasonable interest" by quoting extensively 
from the Callmann treatise relied upon in Thorn in 
formulating our "reasonable interest" requirement: 
 
       The language of the Lanham Act . . . states that the 
       wrongdoer in cases of false advertising is "liable to a 
       civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is 
       or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false 
       description or representation." Indeed the statute goes 
       further in recognizing that the plaintiff need not even 
       be "in the same line of business and in competition 
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       with defendant"; it will be sufficient, in the case of a 
       false designation of origin, that the plaintiff is "doing 
       business in the locality falsely indicated"5 and in the 
       case of a false description of goods or services, that he 
       believes he is or is likely to be damaged, because, for 
       instance, the parties are doing business on 
       different economic levels. The dispositive question 
       should be whether plaintiff has a reasonable interest to 
       be protected against false advertising. 
 
Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1176-77 (emphasis added). 
 
The emphasized language, quoted favorably in Serbin, 
implies that parties who are not in direct competition 
(because they are "doing business on different economic 
levels") nevertheless may have standing to sue if they have 
a "reasonable interest to be protected against false 
advertising." This language, implicitly adopted in Serbin, 
exists in some tension with the District Court's holding that 
only direct competitors or their surrogates have standing. 
Moreover, the District Court's holding conflicts with cases 
from other courts of appeals that confer standing upon 
parties who are not direct competitors or "surrogates" for 
the same. See generally 4 Thomas J. McCarthy, McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 27:32 at 27-51 
(4th ed. 1996) ("With the possible exception of the Ninth 
Circuit, the courts have held that the plaintiff and 
defendant need not be in direct competition with each other 
for plaintiff to have standing to sue . . . under S 43(a)."); see 
also PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120 (2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This analysis rests upon an earlier version ofS 43(a), which, unlike 
the 
present statute enacted in 1992, appeared to create two classes of 
parties with standing to sue. The earlier version of the statute provided 
that an action could be brought 
 
       by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as 
that 
       of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or 
by any 
       person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the 
use 
       of any such false description or representation. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The text of the present 
statute, which is quoted earlier in our opinion, does not differentiate 
textually between the standing of "false designation" plaintiffs and 
others 
to bring suit. 
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Cir. 1984) (recognizing standing of owner of royalty streams 
from music recording to bring action against distributor of 
falsely labeled record albums); Camel Hair & Cashmere 
Inst., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (trade association of makers of cashmere fibers 
and fabrics, but not of finished coats, held to have standing 
to sue for a preliminary injunction against retailers of coats 
falsely labeled as containing more cashmere than they had).6 
For this reason, we do not adopt the standard employed by 
the District Court in this case as our test for standing 
under S 43(a). 
 
As discussed earlier, there exists no single overarching 
test for determining the standing to sue under a given 
statute. With respect to S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the 
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence in this area suggests one 
alternative. Under Ninth Circuit law, the class of persons 
entitled to bring suit under S 43(a) depends on what type of 
Lanham Act violation is being alleged. For violations of the 
"false association" prong of S 43(a), 7 any party with a 
"commercial interest in the product wrongfully identified," 
whether in competition with the defendant or not, has 
standing to bring a S 43(a) action. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 
978 F.2d 1093, 1009 (9th Cir. 1992). For violations of the 
"false advertising" prong of S 43(a), 8 only parties who allege 
a "discernibly competitive injury" have standing. Id. at 
1109. 
 
Applying this dichotomous approach, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that a plaintiff who alleged his name was replaced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. But see L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 
575 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Because Heath is not in the computer business and 
thus is not a competitor of AT&T, Heath does not have standing to raise 
the false advertising claim."); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 
867, 872 (10th Cir.) ("[T]o have standing for a false advertising claim, 
the 
plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant and allege a competitive 
injury."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 920 (1995). 
 
7. A "false association" claim refers to false representations concerning 
the origin, association, or endorsement of goods or services through the 
wrongful use of another's distinctive mark, name, trade dress, or other 
device. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 
8. A "false advertising" claim refers to false representations in 
advertising 
concerning the qualities of goods or services. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108. 
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with that of another actor had standing to sue the movie's 
producer under the "false association" prong even though 
he was not in competition with the producer. Smith v. 
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a singer 
whose distinctive voice was imitated in a commercial was 
deemed to have standing under the "false association" 
prong of S 43(a) even though he could not allege a 
competitive injury vis-a-vis the company that aired the 
commercial. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093. On the other hand, 
a movie producer lacked standing under the "false 
advertising" prong to bring a S 43(a) suit against various 
movie theaters who falsely described the movie as bearing 
an "R" rating as opposed to a "PG" rating because the 
parties were not competitors. Halicki v. United Artists 
Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). The 
Seventh Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit in L.S. Heath & 
Son, Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 
1993) ("Because Heath is not in the computer business and 
thus is not a competitor of AT&T, Heath does not have 
standing to raise the false advertising claim."). 
 
We reject the Ninth Circuit's approach. Section 43(a) 
provides no support for drawing a distinction in standing 
depending on the type of S 43(a) violation alleged. The 
operative language that provides for standing --"any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged" -- does not purport to distinguish between the 
two types of actions available under S 43(a). We also note 
that the Ninth Circuit's approach has been the subject of 
criticism in subsequent cases and in scholarly commentary. 
See, e.g., Guarino v. Sun Co., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 405, 409 
(D.N.J. 1993) (declining to follow Ninth Circuit and noting 
that the distinction has been rejected by McCarthy); 4 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition S 27:33, at 27-52 to 27-53 (1998) ("The passe 
semantic argument [in Halicki] that there cannot be `unfair 
competition' without `competition' between the parties has 
often been rejected."); James S. Wrona, False Advertising 
and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro- 
Competitive Measure?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 1085, 1136-38 
(1995) ("The Ninth Circuit should apply the same criteria 
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when reviewing standing under both section 43(a) 
subparts."). 
 
In short, the Ninth Circuit's approach enjoys no textual 
support and fragments standing jurisprudence under 
S 43(a); accordingly, we decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit's 
reasoning. 
 
The test for antitrust standing set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. 
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), 
provides an appropriate method for adding content to our 
"reasonable interest" test, and we therefore adopt it as the 
test for determining a party's statutory standing under 
S 43(a) of the Lanham Act. While we are thefirst court of 
appeals to utilize this standing analysis in the context of a 
Lanham Act claim, we note that its use has the imprimatur 
of two prominent commentators in the area. See 4 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
S 27:32 n.1 (1998) ("In the author's opinion, some limit on 
the S 43(a) standing of persons remote from the directly 
impacted party should be applied by analogy to antitrust 
law, such as use of the criteria listed in Associated General 
Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519 (1983)."); Restatement (Third) Unfair 
Competition, S 3, cmt. f (1995) ("In determining whether an 
asserted injury is sufficiently direct to justify the imposition 
of liability, the Supreme Court's analysis of similar issues 
under federal antitrust law may offer a useful analogy."). 
 
In Associated General, the Supreme Court addressed the 
standing of plaintiffs to bring a private action for damages 
under S 4 of the Clayton Act, which contains language 
equally expansive as the standing provisions of the Lanham 
Act. 15 U.S.C. S 15 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who shall be injured in his business or 
       property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
       antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of 
       the United States . . . . 
 
The Supreme Court rejected a "literal reading of the 
statute," noting that such an interpretation would be 
"broad enough to encompass every harm that can be 
attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of an 
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antitrust violation." Associated General, 459 U.S. at 529. 
Instead, the Court applied principles of "antitrust standing" 
developed by the lower courts and commentators in 
determining standing to sue under the Clayton Act. Id. at 
535 & n.31 ("Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to 
satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in 
fact, but the court must make a further determination 
whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private 
antitrust action."). The Court then identified a number of 
factors courts should consider in answering this question: 
 
       (1) The nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury: Is the 
       injury "of a type that Congress sought to redress 
       in providing a private remedy for violations of the 
       antitrust laws"? Id. at 538. 
 
       (2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted 
       injury. Id. at 540. 
 
       (3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the 
       alleged injurious conduct. Id. at 542. 
 
       (4) The speculativeness of the damages claim. Id. 
 
       (5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in 
       apportioning damages. Id. at 543-44. 
 
Weighing these factors, the Supreme Court determined 
that a union, which claimed injury due to the anti- 
competitive conduct of a multi-employer association with 
which the union had negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement, lacked standing to pursue a private action 
under the Clayton Act. The union's theory was that the 
multi-employer association coerced third parties and 
certain of its members to contract with nonunion entities, 
thereby restraining the union's business activities. First, 
the Court noted that the union was neither a consumer nor 
a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained 
and that its interests would not necessarily be served or 
disserved by enhanced competition in the market. Since the 
primary aim of the Clayton Act is to protect economic 
freedom in the relevant market, the Court found that the 
nature of the plaintiff 's injury was outside the"area of 
congressional concern" and therefore weighed against 
recognizing standing. Id. at 538-39. 
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Next, the Supreme Court noted that the union's injuries 
were only an indirect result of whatever harm may have 
been suffered by the parties who were coerced. "The 
existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self- 
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the 
public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the 
justification for allowing a more remote party such as the 
Union to perform the office of a private attorney general." 
Id. at 542. 
 
Finally, the Supreme Court pointed to the indirect nature 
of the union's injury as implicating practical concerns of 
judicial administration. If remote plaintiffs like the union 
were to be permitted to sue for damages, "potential 
plaintiffs at each level in the distribution chain would be in 
a position to assert conflicting claims to a common fund 
. . . thereby creating the danger of multiple liability" on the 
one hand or a "massive and complex" damages litigation on 
the other. Id. at 544-55. The Supreme Court concluded: 
 
       [T]he nature of the Union's injury, the tenuous and 
       speculative character of the relationship between the 
       alleged antitrust violation and the Union's alleged 
       injury, the potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
       apportionment of damages, and the existence of more 
       direct victims of the alleged conspiracy [ ] weigh heavily 
       against judicial enforcement of the Union's antitrust 
       claim. 
 
Id. at 545. 
 
Applying these same factors to Appellants' Lanham Act 
claim similarly weighs against judicial enforcement of this 
claim. First, while there may be circumstances in which a 
non-competitor may have standing to sue as we noted 
earlier, the focus of the Lanham Act is on "commercial 
interests [that] have been harmed by a competitor's false 
advertising," Granite State Ins. Co. v. AAMCO 
Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(emphasis in original), and in "secur[ing] to the business 
community the advantages of reputation and good will by 
preventing their diversion from those who have created 
them to those who have not." S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275. 
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While the Appellants have alleged a commercial interest, 
they have not alleged competitive harm. Nor is there any 
indication that Appellants' good will or reputation have 
been harmed directly or indirectly. This is in contrast to 
cases like Waits and Camel Hair, in which the plaintiffs' 
good will and reputation were impacted by the defendants' 
conduct -- in Waits by falsely assuming the plaintiff 's 
voice, and in Camel Hair by falsely representing the 
characteristics of products marketed by the plaintiffs. As 
the District Court stated, "plaintiffs do not allege that 
defendants ran advertisements that said `don't buy engine 
additive at Conte Brothers or Hi/Tor -- instead, buy Slick 
50 directly from the manufacturer.' " Conte Bros., 992 F. 
Supp. at 715. The type of injury suffered by Appellants -- 
loss of sales at the retail level because of alleged false 
advertising -- does not impact the Appellants' ability to 
compete; nor does it detract from the Appellants' reputation 
or good will. Therefore, the alleged harm is not of the "type 
that Congress sought to redress" by enacting the Lanham 
Act. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 538. 
 
Appellants' remoteness from the allegedly harmful 
conduct also weighs against recognizing a right to sue on 
these facts. Here, as in Associated General, the "existence 
of an identifiable class of persons" -- manufacturers of 
competing products -- "whose self-interest would normally 
motivate them to vindicate the public interest . . . 
diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote 
party . . . to perform the office of a private attorney 
general." Associated General, 516 U.S. at 542. Indeed, our 
decision in Serbin, in which we held that consumers whose 
purchases were influenced by false advertising lacked 
standing under S 43(a), involved more directly harmed 
plaintiffs than the retailer class in this case. 
 
Furthermore, any damages suffered by Appellants were, 
if not speculative, then certainly avoidable. There is no 
allegation that Appellants, as retailers, were unable to stock 
Slick 50 for resale. If the retailers responded to the 
artificially-increased popularity of Slick 50 that allegedly 
resulted from the false advertising campaign by stocking 
Slick 50, they would not have suffered any damages. As the 
District Court recognized, the "interest that plaintiffs had in 
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preserving the reputation of motor oil and other competitors 
of Slick 50 appears to be a theoretical, rather than actual 
economic interest." Conte Bros., 992 F. Supp. at 715-16. 
This is in contrast to the concrete and unavoidable nature 
of the injury suffered by Quaker State's competitors who 
cannot reasonably be expected to retool their factory 
operations to meet the artificially-buoyed demand for Slick 
50. 
 
Finally, recognizing the right of every potentially injured 
party in the distribution chain to bring a private damages 
action would subject defendant firms to multiple liability for 
the same conduct and would result in administratively 
complex damages proceedings. Additionally, such a holding 
could result in an enormous number of relatively 
insignificant cases being litigated in the federal courts. If 
every retailer had a cause of action for false advertising 
regardless of the amount in controversy, regardless of any 
impact on the retailer's ability to compete, regardless of any 
impact on the retailer's good will or reputation, and 
regardless of the remote nature of the injury suffered, the 
impact on the federal courts could be significant. For 
example, under Appellants' theory, every corner grocer in 
America alleging that his sales of one brand of chocolate 
bars have fallen could bring a federal action against the 
manufacturer of another brand for falsely representing the 
chocolate content of its product. Such an action hardly 
seems befitting of a statute that was designed primarily to 
resurrect the federal tort of unfair competition after it was 
consigned to the post-Erie ashheap. See 4 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
S 27:7 at 27-12 (Lanham Act drafted in part as "a reaction 
to the 1938 Erie Railroad Supreme Court decision, which it 
was widely felt, had eliminated the existing body of federal 
unfair competition common law."). 
 
D. 
 
In the alternative, the Appellants argue that they have 
sufficiently alleged a directly competitive relationship to 
withstand a motion to dismiss. They point to the following 
allegation in their Complaint: 
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       Slick 50 products are sold to major national retailers 
       directly and through independent distributors. Direct 
       sales are made to national and regional chain stores, to 
       fast lube centers and to resellers and end users in 
       large metropolitan areas. 
 
Compl. P 19; A16. The District Court concluded that this 
allegation, while not entirely without ambiguity, generally 
described Slick 50's distribution pattern and could not 
reasonably be construed as alleging that Quaker State 
directly distributed products to end users. Conte Bros., 992 
F. Supp. at 714. The District Court also noted that any 
ambiguity as to the meaning of the scope of this allegation 
was resolved by admissions in the plaintiffs' brief that the 
parties are not direct competitors. Id.; see also Glick v. 
White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972) 
("Judicial admissions are binding for the purpose of the 
case in which the admissions are made including appeals, 
and . . . an admission of counsel during the course of trial 
is binding on his client."). 
 
Our conclusion would not be altered even if we were to 
assume some percentage of Slick 50's sales were made 
directly to end users and that the parties, therefore, were 
"competitors" in some limited sense. Under the reasoning 
we adopt today, standing under the Lanham Act does not 
turn on the label placed on the relationship between the 
parties. Given the existence of more directly injured parties, 
the tenuousness of Appellants' damages claims, and the 
possibility of multiple recoveries, we would not be inclined 
to revisit our conclusion that the Appellants lack standing 
even if we assumed a nominally competitive relationship. 
 
In any event, Appellants clearly admitted in their District 
Court brief that the parties are not in direct competition, 
see Supp. App. 96 (Pls.' Br. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to 
Dismiss at 5 n.1) ("Plaintiffs are not in direct competition 
with Defendants"), and their alternative argument is 
therefore foreclosed on the grounds stated by the District 
Court. 
 
III. 
 
Expanding standing to parties such as Appellants would 
result in a great increase in marginal litigation in the 
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federal courts and would not serve the underlying purposes 
of the Lanham Act -- to ferret out unfair competitive 
methods and protect businesses from the unjust erosion of 
their good will and reputation. The test we adopt today, 
which was originally announced in Associated General in 
the context of standing under the Clayton Act, provides 
appropriate flexibility in application to address factually 
disparate scenarios that may arise in the future, while at 
the same time supplying a principled means for addressing 
standing under both prongs of S 43(a). 
 
Applying those principles, we reach the same conclusion 
as did the District Court: the Appellants lack standing 
under S 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the District Court dismissing this case and tax 
costs against the Appellants. 
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